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Heterogeneity is likely to be an important determinant of the shape of optimal
tax schemes. This article addresses the issue in a model ￿ la Mirrlees with a con-
tinuum of agents. The agents di￿er in their productivities and opportunity costs
of work, but their labor supplies depend only on a unidimensional combination of
their two characteristics. Conditions are given under which the standard result
that marginal tax rates are everywhere non-negative holds. This is in particular
the case when work opportunity costs are distributed independently of income.
But one can also get negative marginal tax rates: economies where negative tax
rates are optimal at the bottom of the income distribution are studied, and a
numerical illustration is given, based on UK data.
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The bulk of the theory of optimal taxation recommends that the marginal tax
rate be everywhere positive: labor supply is distorted downwards, compared
with laissez-faire. The conditions under which the result holds (continuous labor
supply or intensive margin, unobserved productivity, constant opportunity cost
of work, utilitarian planner with a redistributive motive towards lower incomes)
have been thoroughly investigated (Seade (1977), Seade (1982), Werning (2000),
Hellwig (2007)).
The purpose of the present paper is to describe how negative marginal tax
rates can be optimal, keeping with the intensive setup largely studied in the lit-
erature, when there are multiple dimensions of heterogeneity. Indeed Mirrlees
(1976) in its Section 4 indicates, along a line that will be pursued further here,
that the sign of the marginal tax rate cannot be predicted when the agents in
the economy di￿er along several dimensions of heterogeneity. Workers di￿er in
both their productivities and opportunity costs of work. Under utilitarianism,
heterogeneity comes into play through its impact on cardinal utilities. How social
weights, or marginal utilities of income, vary with income determines the shape
of the optimal tax scheme. Conditional on income, utility levels, and more im-
portantly directly their derivatives with respect to income, may either decrease or
increase with work opportunity costs. This may vary according to circumstances,
depending on whether the cost is associated with poor living conditions (i.e. a
handicap) or re￿ects a taste for leisure or opportunities outside the labor market
(such as gardening at home or black market activities). For a given income, the
social weight is proportional to the expected marginal utilities, where the expec-
tation is taken over the distribution of work opportunity costs at this income
level. Therefore the social weight curve both depends on the speci￿cation of the
cardinal utility function and on how the distribution of work opportunity costs
changes with income.
The fact that heterogeneity can blur the redistribution motive, through the
possible correlation between ability and onerousness of work, has been discussed
in models where agents have a ￿nite number of types. A pioneer work is that of
Stiglitz (1982) who shows that the high-skilled individual should face a negative
marginal tax rate if the low-skilled individual’s upward incentive constraint binds,
1which is the case if social weights are increasing in type. The importance of
this observation for policy was pointed out in Cu￿ (2000), who is the ￿rst to
explicitly link social weights to the opportunity cost of work, using alternative
choices of cardinal utilities. In a model with four types, combining two values for
productivity and two values for the cost of work, Boadway, Marchand, Pestieau,
and Racionero (2002) showed how it can be optimal to have binding upward
incentive constraints when high opportunity costs are associated with small social
weights.
The present paper shows how intuitions derived from ￿nite types models ex-
tend to the standard optimal taxation framework with a continuum of types,
which is more appropriate to practical situations. In this setup, we revisit the
analysis of Saez (2002), making explicit the determinants of the social weights and
linking them to the agents’ heterogenous characteristics. In particular, we build
on the result that negative marginal tax rates are only optimal at the bottom
of the skill distribution if these individuals have below average social weights, a
rather drastic condition. We show that this condition may hold rather naturally
if (i) there is heterogeneity in utilities, holding income constant, and (ii) the het-
erogeneity reduces the social weights put on the low income types, relatively to
those of the larger income types.
We consider a standard model ￿ la Mirrlees where the workers’ choices can be
represented by a utility function which is separable in consumption and leisure. 1
Although agents di￿er in productivity and work opportunity cost, their behavior
is assumed to only depend on a unidimensional combination of the two underlying
parameters, which avoids the technicalities that typically go with multidimen-
sional heterogeneity. A similar shortcut has been used by Brett and Weymark
(2003) in a continuum environment, while Beaudry, Blackorby, and Szalay (2006)
tackles the full multidimensional issue in a model where there are a ￿nite number
of types.
The paper is in three parts. First, without any a priori assumptions on the
relative weights given to the various agents in the economy, we describe the set
of second best allocations. Each allocation is associated with a tax schedule.
Under regularity assumptions, we show that the ￿rst order condition relating the
1Our framework is more general than some of the studies in the previous literature: we allow
for income e￿ects, we do not assume linearity in leisure.
2marginal tax rate to the social weights of the agents, familiar from optimal tax
theory, also applies here with arbitrary exogenous social weights.
The second part of the paper relates the social weights to the underlying
distribution of characteristics in the economy. It describes situations where the
Mirrlees result, everywhere positive marginal tax rates, holds. This is the case,
for instance, when the distribution of opportunity costs is independent of that of
productivities, whatever the impact of these costs on the agents utilities.
The third part builds on Saez (2002) to show when negative tax rates are
optimal. We provide a theoretical example where agents with low productivities
exhibit a large spectrum of opportunity costs, and are better o￿, the larger their
costs. We give a general formula for the social weight of the low skilled, as a func-
tion of the distribution of the heterogenous characteristics and of the derivative
of marginal utility with respect to the heterogeneity parameter. Finally we illus-
trate the potential importance of heterogeneity on a simulation exercise grounded
on UK data. We show that a small change in heterogeneity, from a standard error
of the work opportunity cost of ¿ 100 at the bottom of the earnings distribution
to ¿ 200 at the ￿rst quartile, is enough to warrant negative marginal tax rates.
This indicates that more work and attention should be devoted to heterogeneity
when designing optimal tax schemes.
2 Second best optimality in the Mirrlees model
We consider an economy with a continuum of agents. Agents di￿er by their
opportunity costs of work and their abilities, respectively measured by the non-
negative numbers c and p. The overall utility U of an agent that earns a before
tax income y leading to a ￿nal consumption (or after tax income) c is
u(c) + ~ v(y;);
where  = (c;p) designates the agent’s type. The utility of consumption u(c)
is increasing and concave in c. The second term measures the disutility from
working. It is decreasing and concave in y, increasing in p, decreasing in c: the
larger productivity, the less work is needed to achieve a given production level;
given y, the larger the cost of work, the smaller the utility.
The government does not observe the agents’ types  and has to base redistri-
3bution solely on observed earnings, using a nonlinear tax scheme. A citizen who
earns a before tax income y is left with an after-tax income c = R(y) = y T(y),
where T(y) denotes taxes net of bene￿ts. A measurable function ~ y() is called
an allocation. Given a consumption schedule R, an allocation such that ~ y()
maximizes
u(R(y)) + ~ v(y;)
is incentive compatible. Such an allocation will be denoted ~ yR() to make explicit
its relationship with R.
An allocation is feasible when aggregate production, the sum of the ~ yR(),
is equal to aggregate consumption, the sum of the R(~ yR()). The government
problem is to choose the incentive compatible feasible allocation which is optimal
given his redistributive motives.
We restrict our analysis to the case where the consumers’ behaviors depend
e￿ectively on a unidimensional parameter  = A(). In general when there are
several dimensions of heterogeneity and the government has only one dimension
of observation (income), a major di￿culty is to identify the shape of the set of
types that are associated with a given level of income, since this shape typically
depends on the tax schedule. Here, the shape is given by the level curves of the
function A, independently of R. Formally, the above utility function reduces to
u(c)+v(y;A()) = u(c)+v(y;), where v(y;A())  ~ v(y;).2 The function A is
supposed to be increasing in productivity p and decreasing in the onerousness
of work c. Then v is increasing in its second argument. We assume that the
cross derivative vy is everywhere positive, which implies that the indi￿erence
curves of the agents in the (c;y) space are single-crossing.3 In this circumstance,
it is known that incentive compatibility is equivalent to a simple monotonicity
condition (for completeness we provide the proof in the Appendix). The value of
utility at the maximum, or indirect utility, is denoted UR().
Lemma 1. A necessary and su￿cient condition for an allocation y to be incentive
compatible is that it be nondecreasing in . Furthermore, the indirect utility UR()
2To distinguish the functions of  from those of , we put a tilde on the latter.
3It would be of interest to know whether our analysis extends to situations where utility is
not separable between consumption and leisure, as in Mirrlees (1971) or Hellwig (2007). This
would probably require a general version of the single-crossing assumption in the spirit of Edlin
and Shannon (1998).




Both R(yR()) and UR() are nondecreasing functions of .
Our formulation encompasses the standard model in the literature. The link
can be made precise as follows. Let the single heterogeneity parameter be  = p,
and take the function v as  ^ v(y=p), where y=p is the quantity of labor that
the agent must provide to get income y, given his ability p. The function ^ v
measures the cost of providing labor in utility terms. It is increasing and convex.
In general, when the agents not only have di￿erent productivities but also di￿er
in their costs of providing a given labor supply y=p, the Mirrlees function ^ v(y=p)
becomes  v(y=p;c). The unidimensional restriction here is the assumption that
in fact   v reduces to some v as above.4 With a well designed incentive scheme,
the government may infer the characteristic  of an agent from his income y, but
it is unable, say for a large income and a large , to know whether it comes from
a high productivity type or a low cost of work type.
Given the information available to the government, all the agents of type  =
(c;p) with the same  = A() must be treated equally. The second best optimal
allocations are incentive compatible allocations which maximize a weighted sum of
the agents utility functions, with positive weights () summing up to 1, subject
to the government budget constraint. 5 Let G be the cumulative distribution
function of the parameter . We assume that G admits a density g which is
continuous and positive on the interior 6 of the support [;],  <  < 1. The




f()UR() + [y()   R(y())]g dG(); (1)
4In an earlier version of the paper, we studied the situation where the disutility of work
is isoelastic, ^ v(y) = y1+1=e and the two parameters c and p combine in a one-dimensional
parameter  as follows: v(y;) =  ^ v(y)= with  = (p)1+1=e=c.
5To be precise, one gets all second best allocations when the weights describe the set of
probability measures on the space of types. For notational simplicity, we write the programs
below for probability measures that have a density with respect to the measure on types. The
results are valid in the general case.
6As pointed out by a referee, the multidimensional construction typically implies g() =
g() = 0. This is discussed in Brett and Weymark (2003), p.2565.
5where  is the multiplier of the budget constraint, i.e. the marginal cost of public
funds.
A marginal admissible transformation, that does not change the tax pay-
ers’ labor supplies, consists in uniformly increasing utility by some amount d U
through a change in consumption dR(y) = dU=u0(R(y)), for all y. Since the






Therefore g()  g()=u0(R(yR())) is the density of a probability measure G.
To give a simple statement of the ￿rst order condition for second best optimality,




Computed with the probability measure G, the average modi￿ed social weight









Let p() be the average value of the social weights of all the agents with idio-










(x)jx  ): (3)
By construction, any second best allocation satis￿es, for all 
[1   G
()]EG(
(x)jx  ) + G
()EG(
(x)jx  ) = :
If the average weights of the agents above  is smaller than , the weights of
the agents below is larger than , and conversely. Also, at the lower boundary,
p() = . The ￿rst order condition for the optimal tax rate at , similar to
formula (21) of Mirrlees (1971), can then be expressed as follows. 7
7In a previous version of this paper, ChonØ and Laroque (2007), in a setup where the utility
function is linear in consumption, we provide a full characterization of the set of second best
6Lemma 2. Let y be a second best allocation. Consider  in (;) where y is










The proof in appendix derives the ￿rst order condition at all points, including
discontinuity points of y, and shows, under the additional assumption vyy  0,
that any second best allocation is continuous in the region where marginal tax
rates are nonnegative.8
As a consequence of (4), the marginal tax rate supported by type  has
the same sign as    p(). The formula, as discussed in Diamond (1998) for
an economy with quasi-linear preferences, is associated with an increase d T 0 in
the marginal tax rate on the interval [  d;], which reduces consumption by
 dT 0 d for  in [;]. The left hand side of (4), once multiplied by g()dT 0 d,
corresponds to the distortion in labor supply that takes place in the interval
[  d;]. The right hand side, multiplied by g()dT 0 d, is the change in the
Lagrangian associated with the decrease in consumption above : the government
collects (1 G())dT 0 d, which is valued at the marginal cost of public funds ,
but the utilities of the concerned agents fall, which taking into account their social
weights reduces welfare by (1 G())p()dT 0 d. This marginal transformation
must leave the Lagrangian unchanged, which yields (4).
The sign of the marginal tax rate indicates how the incentive constraints bind.
The intuition, largely taken from Boadway, Marchand, Pestieau, and Racionero
(2002), is as follows. There is no distortion at , and the incentive constraints
are not binding when R0 = 1, i.e. from (4), when the average social weights of
the agents with a higher income is equal to that of the agents with a smaller
income, p() = EG((x)jx  ) = : When the weight of the agents with
lower ’s is larger than the average weight (i.e., p() <  < EG((x)jx  )),
the optimal income tax redistributes in their favor, increasing after tax income
at the bottom, lowering it at the top: the slope of the after tax income curve
becomes smaller than 1, in e￿ect creating a positive marginal tax rate. The
allocations, without the no-bunching condition of Lemma 2. Werning (2007) also studies the
set of second best allocations.
8We are grateful to an anonymous referee who urged us to investigate the continuity prop-
erties of the optimal allocations.
7redistribution is limited by the fact that the high skilled would fake being low
skilled: the incentive constraints binds downwards. Conversely when the social
weights of the agents above  is larger than , redistribution lowers after tax
incomes of types below  (compared to laissez faire) and increases that of types
above : this gives the after tax income curve a slope larger than 1, the marginal
tax rate is negative and incentive constraints bind upwards.
3 Utilitarianism and positive marginal tax rates
Lemma 2 links the optimal tax rate with the social weights at a regular second
best allocation. From (4), the marginal tax rate supported by an agent of type
0 depends on the average social weight of the agents of type  larger than 0.
Therefore, to study the sign of the marginal tax rate, we relate the values of
the social weights to the objective maximized by the government. Utilitarianism
requires a speci￿cation of cardinal utilities. A priori the cardinal utility can be any
function K [U;].9 The only requirement for consistency with private choices is
that it increases in its ￿rst argument. Any di￿erence between types can be taken
into account through the second argument of K. Since by Lemma 1, incentive
compatibility implies that the indirect utility function is nondecreasing in , K is
nondecreasing in  through its ￿rst argument. To keep in line with the literature,
we assume that productivity p only enters cardinal utility by its impact on U,
through : it is enough for our purpose to restrict ourselves to cardinal utilities
of the form K [U;c].10





9We adopt a utilitarian viewpoint: the cardinal utility is an objective measure of the agents’
well being. All the results of course apply to a situation where the function K re￿ects society’s
value judgments.
10As pointed out by a referee, formally one does not need the extra degree of freedom given
by the parameter c to reverse traditional conclusions. It is enough to have a utilitarian func-
tion K [U;] with a ￿rst derivative KU [UR();] which is su￿ciently increasing in its second
argument to counteract the e￿ect of the ￿rst argument, so that KU [UR();] is increasing in
. From an economic viewpoint, however, one would need some empirical justi￿cation for this
unconvincing assumption. The shape of the (non-degenerate) distribution of c conditional on
 may provide a rationale for the type of phenomena under study, as illustrated in the last
section of the paper.
8under its budget constraint, where F(cj) denotes the cumulative distribution
function of c, conditional on the equality  = A(). Identifying the Lagrangian
with its second best counterpart (1), the associated weights (;c) are equal, up
to a multiplicative normalization factor, to KU[UR();c]. Under the assumption
that labor supply is driven by the one-dimensional parameter , the optimal















The above formulas make clear how the cardinal representation plays a role,
through its impact on the marginal social value of a change in utility KU[U;c].
When KU is increasing in its second argument, large work opportunity costs,
holding  constant, go with large social weights: this can be interpreted as if
a large opportunity cost comes from a handicap that deserves some social com-
pensation. When KU is decreasing in its second argument, a large opportunity
cost of work reduces the social weight, perhaps because non-market time allows
enjoyable leisure. All things considered, the quantity of interest is the integral of
KU with respect to the conditional distribution F(cj).
3.1 The unidimensional case
Consider the standard Mirrlees case where c is constant across the population,
and p has a continuous distribution on [
p;
p
]. Productivity, as well as cardinal
utility, increases with p. Then we recover the optimal taxation result of non-
negative marginal tax rates everywhere, provided the function K is concave.
Proposition 1. Assume that K[U] is concave. Then the optimal utilitarian
optimum exhibits positive marginal tax rates, at any regular point below the top
productivity where there is no bunching.
Proof: From the de￿nition of the weights (2) , since after tax income and the
indirect utility both increase with  along any incentive compatible allocation,
9social weights decrease with p, and from (3), p(p) decreases as well. Since
p(
p) = , p(p) <  for all p < 
p
, and (4) gives the standard result: the
marginal tax rate is always positive.
When K is concave in U, the cardinal utility speci￿cation makes society more
redistributive than the initial separable U: the social weight K0(U) is decreasing
in U. This is the situation considered in Mirrlees of a redistributive government.
Note that a regressive government would not implement positive tax rates.
Consider the case where K[U] is strictly convex and where the original utility
function is linear in consumption (u(R(y)) = R(y)). Then the weight 
a() =
K0(UR()) is increasing in , so that p() is increasing as well. The optimal
marginal tax rate is negative everywhere, except at the boundaries! Heterogeneity
is not necessary for negative marginal tax rates to be optimal.
3.2 Non-negative marginal tax rates and heterogeneity
There are a variety of cases where tax rates are non-negative, even in the pres-
ence of heterogeneity. As should be clear from the previous section, a su￿cient
condition is that the average social weights of the agent of characteristics  de-
creases with . If the only parameter entering the social utility function is , this
is warranted by the concavity of the welfare index. 11 Otherwise one must put
restrictions that bear simultaneously on how the social weight KU varies with c
and on how the conditional distribution of c given  changes with .
Proposition 2. Assume that the cardinal utility K[U;c] is concave in U. As-
sume furthermore that KU[U;c] is nondecreasing in c and that the distribution
of c, conditional on , is ￿rst order stochastically decreasing in .
Then under utilitarianism, the weights () are decreasing and marginal tax







11From the initial assumption of Section 1 and Lemma 1 labor supply only depends on  and
the indirect utility level is nondecreasing in . Given , the only e￿ect of heterogeneity is to










Figure 1: Social weights and negative marginal tax rates
Then the function 	 is decreasing in a, since ~ , proportional to KU, is. It
is decreasing in b by ￿rst order stochastic dominance. It follows that () =
	(;) is also decreasing in its argument. Multiplying by u0(R(yR())), which
is decreasing in , yields a decreasing ().
The result also holds in the opposite situation: KU[U;c] decreasing in c, and
c ￿rst order stochastically nondecreasing in . It is simpler to state when the
opportunity cost, c, is independent from the income level.
Corollary 1. Assume that the cardinal utility K[U;c] is concave in U. When
c is independent from , marginal tax rates are non-negative.
Proof: The function 	 de￿ned above does not depend on its second argument.
As a result, () = 	(;) is decreasing, irrespective of the way the opportunity
cost enters the cardinal utility.
4 Negative marginal tax rates
4.1 A simple theoretical example
The following example illustrates the analysis. At the lowest productivity 
p, the








], there is a unique value of c, equal to 
c. The labor supply of the
11agent of type (p;c) depends on a parameter  = A(p;c), where A is a function




) < m = A(
p;




All the agents of the segment [m;] di￿er only by their productivities. All the
agents in [;m] have the same low productivity 
p, but have di￿erent, decreasing,
opportunity costs.12
Suppose now that the cardinal utility is K[UR() + kc], where K is concave
increasing and k is a well chosen scalar. With a positive k, holding  constant,
a larger c yields a higher utility level, obtained for instance through activities
at home or on the black market, and therefore low marginal utilities of income.
With this parameterization, () = K0[UR() + kc] is decreasing on [m;].
Suppose, possibly for a large enough k, that it increases on [;m]. One then gets
Figure 1. The agent with the largest social weight is the m person with lowest
productivity and opportunity cost to work. The associated function p(), which
measures the average height of (x) for x larger than , is represented on the
Figure: p() increases whenever it lies above the graph of , decreases when it
is below the graph, and has an horizontal tangent when it crosses the  curve.
Also, we know that p() = . From (4), in the situation depicted on Figure 1,
all the agents in the segment AB then face negative tax rates.
More generally, there are a number of cases where speci￿c welfare functions
would lead to (locally) negative marginal tax rates. Suppose for simplicity that
the utility function u is linear in consumption. Consider a situation where pro-
ductivity p is an increasing function of  while the opportunity cost of work c
is a decreasing function of : a larger income indicates a larger productivity and
a smaller opportunity cost of work. Assume that the cardinal utility puts a high
value on the willingness to work, meaning that the derivative KUc dc=d is neg-
ative and large in absolute value, larger than the absolute value of KUU dUR=d.
A high enough value would make the optimal income tax regressive.
12Technically, given , the distribution of c is degenerate: for   m, c is equal to 
c
while for   m, c is equal to the unique root of the equation  = A(
p;c).
124.2 May negative marginal tax rates be optimal for low
skilled workers?
While the preceding example is illustrative, the distribution of the work oppor-
tunity cost conditional on  is degenerate. It is interesting to more generally
identify the circumstances where negative marginal tax rates on low incomes are
likely to be optimal.
First a theoretical remark is useful. As noted by Saez (2002), p.1054, negative
marginal tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution can only occur if
the social weights of the concerned agents are smaller than the average social
weight. Indeed, to see negative marginal tax rates bearing on the low incomes,
i.e. in a neighborhood of , from (4), in the absence of pooling 13 p() has to be
larger than  in this neighborhood. Since by construction p() = , assuming
di￿erentiability, this amounts to
dp
d
> 0 in a neighborhood of :
Since by (3) dp=d = [p()   ()]g()=[1   G()], this occurs when ,
the social weight of the agents, is smaller than , the average social weight in
the economy, in this neighborhood. In the absence of pooling, a necessary and
su￿cient condition for the low income agents, with  close to , to face negative
marginal tax rates at the optimum is that the social weight () be smaller than
the average social weight in the economy. An expression for this condition can
be given, where both the dependence of the social weights on the heterogeneity
characteristics and the distribution of c conditionally on  interact.
Proposition 3. When the functions ~ (;c), F(cj) and G() are twice con-
tinuously di￿erentiable with respect to their arguments, one has

()    =
ZZ




13Under the assumption that the marginal cost of work is zero at the origin, vy(0;) =
0, it is easy to show that everybody works at an optimum. Indeed adapting the proof of
Lemma 2, a small increase dy in income at the origin does not change the utility but increases
the Lagrangian by dy. This assumption is satis￿ed in the standard example described in
footnote 4.
13where
















is the cross-product14 of the two gradient vectors rF and r~ .
Proposition 3 gives an expression for the weight () in the situation where
the distributions are smooth. There are two terms in the formula:
 The second term is positive, from the standard motive of aversion to in-
come inequality. Indeed, from (6), ~ (;c) = ~ (;c)u0(R(yR())) and
the derivative @~ =@ is typically negative. It is only equal to zero when
there are both no desire for redistribution across the  characteristic (the
cardinal utility is linear in U and () is constant), and no income e￿ect
(u is linear in c).
 The ￿rst term, @~ =@c @F=@, cannot be signed in general. It is equal to
zero in a number of cases, for instance if the two parameters are indepen-
dently distributed (@F=@ = 0), or if the social weight does not depend on
c. Then the marginal tax rate is positive at the bottom of the income dis-
tribution. When c is ￿rst order stochastically decreasing in  (@F=@  0)
and ~  is nondecreasing in c, then the term is positive, which yields the
analog to Proposition 2 at the point .
In practice, for negative tax rates to be optimal, the ￿rst term must be neg-
ative and larger in absolute value than the second one. A special case where
this is easier to achieve is when society has no aversion to income inequality ( u
linear in consumption and K linear in U). The only redistribution motive then
is linked to the c parameter, i.e. K[U;c] = K(c)U. In this circumstance, for
all  ~ (;c) = K(c) and















where  denotes the density of the marginal distribution of the parameter c in
the economy. Suppose that K is increasing in the work opportunity cost, so that
14The cross-product of two vectors of IR
2 is the product of their modulus, multiplied by the
sinus of their oriented angle. A simple diagram, noting that @F=@c > 0 and @~ =@ < 0,
shows that the angle is between 0 and  under the conditions of Proposition 2.
14the government wants to transfer income to the agents with the larger cost. Then
the marginal tax rate is negative at  when the conditional distribution of c at
 is ￿rst order stochastically smaller than the unconditional distribution of c.
4.3 An illustration using UK data
The following computations are based on UK data. We use annual earnings and
marginal tax rate information 15 in the UK for the year 2003. Our starting point is
the speci￿cation of Brewer, Saez, and Shephard (2008), which served to compute
optimal taxes in the Mirrlees review of the UK tax system. The basic utility





with e = :25, and the ￿rst order condition R0(y) = (y=)1=e allows us to recover
the parameter  from earnings and the marginal tax rate. Note that with this
speci￿cation  is equal to the income that would be observed under laissez-faire.
The density of  is obtained from standard kernel estimation, with a rather large
bandwidth (¿ 3000) to get smooth drawings. Let c stand for a measure of the
work opportunity cost. We take as cardinal utility:
K[U;
c] =  exp[ (U   
c)];












With the exponential speci￿cation the e￿ect of heterogeneity factors out, and
the optimization is easy. Also the social weight of agent (;c) is proportional to
exp[ UR() + c]: it is increasing in the work opportunity cost.
We have to make choices on the shape of the distribution of c conditional
on , for which we have no guidance from empirical observations. The results
that we present are the ones that we found most suggestive, out of a number of
experiments. We assume the distribution of c, conditional on , to be normal
























Figure 2: Optimal tax schedules and heterogeneity in work opportunity costs
16with zero mean. In the baseline case, we take its standard error to be equal
to ¿ 200, independently of . This is a small number (the median earnings in
2003 is equal to ¿ 16,500). In variants, we keep the conditional distribution of
c unchanged for the top three quartiles, but we suppose that low  types, i.e.













where k takes the values 0;:25;:50;:75 and 1, corresponding to a standard error
(0) respectively equal to ¿ 0, 50, 100, 150 and 200.
It is not implausible that the dispersion of work opportunity costs increases
with earnings, but we have no evidence to support this assumption. It certainly







increases with  for all k, k < 1, the weights () will take the shape of Figure 1,
for well chosen parameters. Indeed, as shown in the upper panel of Figure 2, the
marginal tax rate increases with (0), and negative tax rates are optimal for (0)
equal to or smaller than ¿ 100. For small values of k and (0), lower weights
imply lower transfers to the low income population ( R(0) is increasing with (0)
as shown in the lower panel).
This example makes clear how lowering the social weights () at the bottom
of the income distribution modi￿es the optimal tax schedule: it leads to redis-
tribute away from the bottom towards the middle and the top of the distribution.
This involves reducing the income level of the low  types while increasing the
slope of the after tax schedule (and therefore the labor supply of these agents)
to maintain or increase the incomes of the middle and upper class.
Notice that, in this example, the distribution of c is symmetric (F increasing
with () for negative c, decreasing for positive c) and the derivative @~ =@c
is increasing in c. Under such circumstances, the ￿rst term of equation (7), once


























17Finally, while the numbers chosen for the dispersion of the work opportunity
costs look small (¿ 200), they are magni￿ed through the expectation of the ex-
ponential of the normal variable: 2=2 = 20000. Indeed, one would get identical
results in a model where c would be a deterministic function of , equal to
20000 2()=2. The certainty equivalent gain associated with the change in the
distribution of work opportunity costs in the ￿rst quartile is $ (20000 2()=2),
of the order of magnitude of average income. Further work is needed to better un-
derstand how to calibrate the e￿ect of heterogeneity in the social choice function.
5 Conclusion
Even keeping with a setup where labor supply is driven by an exogenously prede-
termined unidimensional combination of the agents’ characteristics, heterogeneity
in utilities may play an important role in the determination of optimal redistribu-
tive schemes. The optimal allocation depends on the average social weights of the
agents in the economy, computed conditionally on observable income. Hetero-
geneity enters through two channels: the individual social weight which depends
on the microeconomic characteristics, and the distribution of characteristics con-
ditional on income. We have spelled out this relationship, and applied it to ￿nd
conditions under which negative marginal tax rates may be optimal at the bottom
of the income distribution. A numerical example indicates that small variations
with income of (unobserved) heterogeneity may induce large changes in optimal
tax schedules.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We adapt the simple argument of Rochet (1987). (The property holds more
generally under the single crossing condition.) First, suppose y is incentive com-
patible. Then, using the indirect utility UR, incentive compatibility implies for
0 < 1:
v(y(0);1) v(y(0);0)  UR(1) UR(0)  v(y(1);1) v(y(1);0): (9)
It follows that:






which yields y(1)  y(0).
Conversely, suppose y is nondecreasing. Then de￿ne UR(:) by its derivative
U0
R() = v(y();) and u(R(y())) = UR()   v(y();), the general level of
UR and R being given by the government budget constraint. Then, for 0 < 1,
20using vy > 0,








= v(y(0);1)   v(y(0);0);
which yields incentive compatibility.
The allocation y() being nondecreasing admits a right and left limit at every
point . These limits are noted y(+) and y( ) respectively. Dividing the right
inequality of (9) by 1   0 > 0 shows that the di￿erence quotient [UR(1)  
UR(0)]=[1   0] is bounded below v(y(
+
0 );0) as 1 tends to 0 from above.
Now permuting the indexes 0 and 1 in the left inequality of (9) and dividing by
0   1 > 0 shows that the di￿erence quotient is bounded above v(y(
 
0 );0)
as 1 tends to 0 from below. It follows that the indirect utility function UR is
everywhere continuous and di￿erentiable whenever y is continuous. But y being
a nondecreasing function is continuous everywhere except at most at countably
many ’s. This yields the desired result.
It is worth examining discontinuity points 0 where y(
 
0 ) < y(
+
0 ). Since
UR is continuous at 0, the agent 0 is indi￿erent between y(
 
0 ) and y(
+
0 ). So
the left inequality of (9) holds with y(
+
0 ) instead of y(0). It follows that the
di￿erence quotient tends to v(y(
+
0 );0) as 1 tends to 0 from above. Similarly
the di￿erence quotient tends v(y(
 
0 );0) as 1 tends to 0 from below. Thus,
the indirect utility everywhere admits a right and a left derivative, which coincide
at all but at most countably many points.
Finally, incentive compatibility and vy < 0 yield for 1 > 0
u(R(y(1)))   u(R(y(0)))  v(y(0);1)   v(y(1);1)  0;
implying that R is nondecreasing in  (and in y).
Proof of Lemma 2
We present here a heuristic derivation of the ￿rst order condition (4). To
simplify notation, we denote the indirect utility by U rather than UR. According
21to Lemma 1, U0() = v(y();) at all but at most countably many ’s. As
explained in the above proof, discontinuity points of y correspond to kinks of U.
Since v(y;) is increasing in y, the inverse function Y (:;) = [v(:;)] 1 is well
de￿ned for all . Except at discontinuity points of y, y() = Y (U0();) and
R(yR()) =  R(U;U
0;);
where  R(U;U0;) = u 1[U   v(Y (U0;);)]. Note that YU0 = 1=vy and  R0
U =






()U() + [Y (U




Consider small changes U(x) and U0(x) to the optimal solution U(x) and U0.
Pick a point  and keep U0 unchanged outside a small interval [; + a] where
y is locally strictly increasing (no bunching). Let U0(x) be a small continuous






For su￿ciently small a and U0, the variation U is admissible, i.e. the allocation
Y (U0+U0;) is increasing in . At the ￿rst order, the change in the Lagrangian


















as a goes to 0. From the agent’s ￿rst order condition u0R0 + v0
y = 0, the term
in square brackets is equal to the marginal tax rate T 0(yR()). By de￿nition,



















Using (3) and rearranging terms, it is easy to check that limL=U() = 0 is
equivalent to (4).
22At a discontinuity point  of the allocation, the limits of L=U() as a
tends to 0 from above and from below di￿er: they are given by (10) where
yR(+) and yR( ) respectively replace yR(). Since UR is continuous, as shown
in the proof of Lemma 1, the agent  is indi￿erent between the two values of
y. The indi￿erence curves in the plane (c;y) have a positive slope, equal to
 u0=vy, which decreases with y. Therefore the term in square brackets evaluated
at yR(+) is lower than or equal to the same term evaluated at yR( ). If this
term is nonnegative (that is, if the marginal tax rates at the two points are
nonnegative) and if vyy  0, the same property holds for the ￿rst term of (10)
as a whole. Since the second term is continuous and the sum is zero, it must be
the case that the allocation yR is continuous: yR( ) = yR(+).16
Proof of Proposition 3
By integration by parts





































































Noting that the last line is equal to zero since F(
c
j) = 1 and F(
cj) = 0 and
rearranging terms yield (7).
16It is easy to check that the assumption vyy  0 yields the concavity of the Lagrangian with
respect to U0 in the region where marginal tax rates are nonnegative. We thank an anonymous
referee for suggesting this property to us.
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